Abstract. Portable Communication Systems (PCS) can provide mobile users with an opportunity to enjoy global roaming services. A lot of researchers have previously proposed their secure protocols for protecting the mobile privacy of the users in PCS. Most protocols pointed out that Lee-Yeh's protocol and Lee et al.'s protocol are vulnerable to some attacks. Then they proposed their improved protocols to remedy these shortcomings. Unfortunately, we found out that the Lee et al.'s protocol still cannot achieve user anonymity and does not provide perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we also propose an improved protocol to solve these security problems. Compared with other protocols, our proposed protocol not only achieves all security requirements and functionality requirements but also is more efficient.
Introduction
Wireless communication systems have become one of the most important applications in our daily life. Generally speaking, mobile users can access the services provided by the home location register (HLR) in a visited location register (VLR). When mobile station (MS) roams into a foreign network, VLR authenticates the roaming users with the help of s user's HLR. In recently years, many protocols discussed the user anonymity for wireless environment [4-9, 12, 13, 19, 20] ; and theses protocols used the public-key systems to protect the privacy of the MS.
In 2005, Lee and Yeh [10] proposed a new delegation-based authentication protocol for portable communication systems (PCSs) . Their protocol also used the public-key cryptosystems to provide user anonymity, non-repudiation, mutual authentication and communication load. Besides, their protocol used off-line authentication processes to provide communicational efficiency, such as GSM [17] . By this, HLR helps VLR to authenticate with MS in the first authentication processes. Then VLR can authenticate MS without contacting HLR in the later authentication processes. This movement reduces the time of authentication.
However, Lee et al. [11] pointed out that Lee-Yeh's off-line authentication processes are vulnerable to masquerade user attacks. Any malicious VLR can forge a valid message to login HLR. That is, if a malicious VRL successfully logins into the HLR, the MS cannot repudiate these correct messages that are not produced by him/her. Therefore, Lee et al. proposed a slightly modified improvement of LeeYeh's protocol based on hash chain [14, 15] to remedy this security weakness. They claimed that their enhanced protocol achieves non-repudiation in both the on-line and the off-line authentication processes. Unfortunately, we found that both Lee-Yeh's and Lee et al.'s protocols cannot achieve user anonymity and does not provide perfect forward secrecy [21] . Perfect forward secrecy emphasizes that an adversary obtains a subset of session keys in some ways based on which he/she cannot discover the further session keys. Recently, some related papers about this area have been proposed by some researchers [1, 16, 18, 22] . Tang and Wu pointed out that Lee-Yeh's protocol is vulnerable to a possible attack [18] . As a result, they proposed an improved scheme for protecting mobile privacy in wireless networks. However, Lu et al. [16] showed that the Tang-Wu's protocol also cannot provide mobile privacy. In 2010, Youn and Lim [22] showed that Lee et al.'s protocol [11] cannot achieve private roaming service. Youn and Lim then proposed an improved scheme to remedy the weakness. However, Chen et al. [1] pointed out that the YounLim's protocol is also vulnerable to two drawbacks and presented an improved scheme.
The following security requirements and functionality requirements of the delegation-based authentication protocol for PCSs should be taken into consideration.
Security requirements:
Prevent impersonation attacks:
An adversary trying to impersonate as the legitimate user to fool the trust server, or vise versa, to impersonate as the trust server to communicate with the legitimate user, should be prevented.
Prevent replay attacks:
An adversary attempting to intercept the messages between two communicating parties and replay these messages in the further processes, should be prevented.
Prevent guessing attacks:
An adversary trying to mount a guessing attack by guessing the user's password [3] , should be prevented.
Prevent stolen-verifier attacks:
An adversary wanting to steal the passwordverifier from the trust server and use it directly to masquerade as a legitimate user in an authentication run, should be prevented.
Prevent denial of server attacks
An adversary attempting to disrupt the authentication between a legal mobile user and authentication server, should be prevented. Attacks like this would prevent legal users from gaining access to the authentication server [24] .
Functionality requirements:
Mutual authentication:
Not only a user can verify the identity of a server, but also a server can authenticate a user.
Session key agreement:
Severs and users can establish a session key for protecting their subsequent communications.
Non-repudiation:
No user can deny that he/she is the producer of these messages before these messages are verified.
User anonymity:
It conceals the identity of the communicating parties. User anonymity prevents an adversary from obtaining sensitive personal information. The identity of the user should not be sent in the public network [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 23 ].
Perfect forward secrecy:
When an adversary obtains a subset of session keys, in any way, he/she cannot discover the further session keys.
In this paper, we propose another improved scheme to overcome these weaknesses. The proposed scheme achieves not only the security requirements, but also the functionality requirements. This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review Lee et al.'s delegation-based authentication protocol [11] . The security flaws of Lee et al.'s protocol are shown in Section 3. Section 4 describes our improved protocol. In Section 5, we discuss the security and the efficiency of our improved protocol. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
Review of Lee et al.'s protocol
In this section, we will review Lee et al.'s delegation-based authentication protocol [11] . Their scheme is divided into three processes: the setup process, the on-line authentication process, and the off-line authentication process. In the setup process, MS registers with the HLR and obtains a smart card through a secure channel for some service. In the online authentication process, when the MS roams in a new VLR, the VLR authenticates the identity of the MS through the HLR. In the off-line authentication process, the VLR can authenticate the MS without contacting the HLR and requesting further processes. Table 1 lists the notations used in this paper. The detailed phases are shown in the following sections.
Setup process
The HLR generates a secret random number x to compute his/her public key v = g x mod p, where x is a HLR's private key. The MS sends a request to the HLR for registration through a secure channel. Then HLR generates a random number k to compute the MS's public key K = g k mod p and private key σ = x + kK (mod p). Finally, the key pair (σ, K) is stored in the MS's SIM card. Additionally, the MS generates a random number n 1 and pre-computes a hash chain h (1) ( n 1 ), h (2) ( n 1 ),…, h (n+1) (n 1 ), where h (1) ( n 1 ) = h( n 1 ) and Step 6. VLR → MS:
After receiving these messages from the HLR,
Then the VLR verifies n 2 and l and then sets C 1 as the current session key SK. Finally, the VLR
After receiving these messages from the VLR, the MS obtains N 1 by using his/her private key and checks to see if N 1 is the same as the previous sent N 1 in Step 3. If they are the same, MS has successfully authenticated VLR and computes C 1 as the current session key SK. The detailed steps are shown in Fig. 1 .
Off-line authentication process
MS selects h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) from his/her database and computes [h (n-i+1) (n 1 )] Ci , where n is the limited time of off-line authentication and i = 1, 2,...,n. Finally, the MS sends [h (n-i+1) (n 1 )] Ci to the VLR. After receiving these messages from the MS, the VLR obtains h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) by using the session key C i and checks if h(h (n-i+1) (n 1 )) is the same as l. If they are the same, the VLR updates l = h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and i = i+1, where the count i ≦ n. Afterwards, the VLR computes the session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ) .
Weaknesses of Lee et al.'s protocol
In this section, we will demonstrate that Lee et al.'s protocol fails to provide perfect forward secrecy and perfect backward secrecy. Besides, their protocol cannot achieve a dynamic ID. That is, if the clients use their protocol to process the secret information, such as the personal privacy or the tracking of the user, the adversary can intercept the user's ID to know who is communicating with the remote server S. More details are described as follows: 
Lack of dynamic ID
The most important issue is not only the security problem but also the personal privacy. In the recent years, there are many researches that point out some advantages in the user anonymity for wireless environments [2, 4-9, 11, 12, 14] . In a normal public network, the adversary could intercept the user's identity and find out who was communicating with VLR and obtain sensitive personal information. Therefore, a user's identity must be anonymous. Namely, a user's identity should be encrypted or replaced with a temporal identity. But we found out that Lee et al.'s protocol cannot achieve any dynamic ID. The detail is described in the following paragraph.
In the on-line authentication process, the MS sends K to the VLR in Step 1. However, the public key K is similar to the identity of the mobile user. Although the public key K is only used in the on-line authentication process, K is both immobile and sent through a public network. Any user can intercept the user's public key K from the public wireless network, including illegal ones. That is, Lee et al.'s protocol fails to achieve anonymity service. When MS communicates with VLR in an on-line authentication process, any one could figure out who is communicating with VLR and HLR. It triggers the personal privacy problems. Therefore, we think the user's anonymity should be taken into consideration in PCSs. It's obvious that Lee et al.'s protocol does not provide user anonymity to protect a user's privacy.
Perfect forward secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy is a very important security attribute. However, we found that Lee et al.'s delegation-based authentication protocol for PCSs fails to provide perfect forward secrecy. Perfect forward secrecy means that if an adversary obtains a subset of session key in some ways, he/she cannot
extract the past session keys. More details are described in the following paragraphs.
In Lee et al.'s off-line authentication protocol, the MS sends an authentication request [h (n-i+1) (n 1 )] Ci to the VLR, where n is the limited time of off-line authentication and i = 1, 2,...,n. Then the VLR obtains h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) by using C i and checks if h(h (n-i+1) (n 1 )) is the same as l. If they are the same, VLR updates l=h
)·(n1) and i = i+1, where the count i ≦ n.
Then, the VLR computes the session key C i+1 = h(l, Ci) for securing communications with the MS. Finally, the MS and the VLR store the session key C i+1 and l for the next communication. Once the session key C i is disclosed in an off-line authentication, the adversary can obtain h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and compute the session key C i+1 =h(l, C i ). Besides, he/she also can obtain the next session key by using C i+1 .
As an example, let's assume that n = 10. Then after the on-line authentication, MS stores h (9) (n 1 ), h (8) (n 1 ), h (7) (n 1 )….. h (1) (n 1 ) in his/her database and the VLR obtains l = h (10) (n 1 ) and C 1 . In the first off-line authentication, the MS sends an authentication request [h (9) (n 1 )] C1 to the VLR, where C 1 is the session key established in the on-line authentication. Then the VLR obtains h (9) (n 1 ) by using C 1 and checks if h(h (9) (n 1 )) is the same as l. If they are the same, the VLR updates l = h (9) (n 1 ) and computes the current session key C 2 = h(l, C 1 ) for the next communication with the MS. If the adversary obtains the session key C 1, somehow, he/she can decrypt [h (9) (n 1 )] C1 and compute l = h (10) (n 1 ). Then the adversary can also compute the current session key C 2 = h(l, C 1 ) and store C 2 for the second off-line authentication. This means that if a given session key C i is disclosed, all the other session keys C i+1 will be opened. That is, when the MS communicates with the VLR, the adversary can decrypt all the massages between the MS and the VLR. Therefore, Lee et al.'s protocol cannot provide perfect forward secrecy.
Our improved protocol
In this section, we propose an improvement on Lee et al.'s protocol, which keeps the merits of the original protocol, and at the same time, can provide user anonymity and achieve perfect forward secrecy. To provide user anonymity in Lee et al.'s protocol, we assume that the identity of the user is encrypted or has been replaced with a temporal identity. Our improved protocol consists of three processes: the setup process, the on-line authentication process, and the off-line authentication process. The detailed phases are shown in the following sections.
Setup process
The HLR computes his/her public key v= g x mod p, where x is the HLR's private key. When the MS sends a request to the HLR for registration through a secure channel, the HLR computes the MS's public key K = g k mod p and private key σ = x + kK (mod p) and decides an initialized temporary identity T ID, where k is a random number generated by HLR. Afterwards, MS's SIM card contains the key pair (σ, K) and T ID . Additionally, MS pre-computes a hash chain h (1) 
(n 1 ), where n 1 is a random number generated by MS.
On-line authentication process
Step
MS → VLR: T ID
The MS obtains the initialized temporary identity T ID from his/her SIM card and sends T ID to VLR.
Step 2. VLR → MS: n 2 , ID V After receiving this message from MS, VLR generates a random number n 2 and responses n 2 and ID V to MS. 
Step 3. MS → VLR: r, s, T

Off-line authentication process
The MS obtains h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and T IDnew from his/her database and computes [h the VLR. After receiving these messages from the MS, the VLR obtains h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) by using the session key C i and T IDnew . Then VLR checks if h(h (n-i+1) (n 1 )) is the same as l. If they are the same, VLR updates l = h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and i = i+1, where the count i ≦ n. The VLR computes the session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ) and decides a new temporary identity T IDnewi 
to the HLR. After receiving these messages, the MS obtains T IDnewi and updates the SIM card for the next authentication process. Besides, the HLR obtains T IDnewi and updates his/her database.
Security analysis
In this paper, we propose a modification to the improved Lee et al.'s protocol, to achieve the requirement of user anonymity and perfect forward secrecy. The focus of this section is on security requirements and functional requirements. Therefore, in this section, we will only discuss the essential security requirements and functional requirements that a portable communication system should have.
Resistance to impersonation attacks
Impersonation attacks are very treacherous when the adversary has the ability to send a valid message to fool another user or the server herself. This attack should be taken into consideration and should be avoided. Assume that the adversary is trying to impersonate a legitimate user to login to the server. Then he/she needs to send a valid message to the VLR in the off-line authentication processes. However, the adversary cannot impersonate any legitimate users to deceive the VLR, because he/she cannot compute [h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) ⊕T IDnew ] Ci without knowing h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and T IDnew which are secretly stored in the SIM card and the session key C i . It can be assured that the adversary cannot perform impersonation attacks in our improved protocol.
Besides, the adversary might want to impersonate a legitimate VLR to cheat the MS to obtain some benefits. However, the adversary has no way to perform this attack, because he/she cannot decrypt [h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) ⊕T IDnew ] Ci without the session key C i . Therefore, the adversary cannot impersonate a VLR to cheat the legitimate user in our improved protocol.
Resistance to denial of service attacks
Denial-of-Service attacks can disturb the availability of the authentication between the legitimate user and server. This kind of attack can prevent legitimate users to access the server. We can assume that the adversary wants to perform a denial of service attacks to paralyze the VLR. This DoS will not work in our improved protocol. In off-line authentication processes, the MS can obtain h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and T IDnew from the SIM card and send [h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) ⊕T IDnew ] Ci to access the VLR. After the VLR receives this message, he/she obtains C i and T ID from his/her database and verifies the MS by checking if h(h (n-i+1) (n 1 )) is the same as l. If it holds, the VLR updates l = h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and T IDnewi and computes the session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ). Since the VLR can control the amount of incoming login messages in the off-line authentication processes, no one can perform the denial of service attack on our improved protocol.
Resistance to replay attacks
Assuming that the adversary wants to replay the message [h (n-i+1) (n 1 )⊕T IDnew ] Ci to cheat the VLR, he/she will fail, because the VLR has the ability to detect this attack. When the adversary intercepts the login message in the off-line authentication processes and retransmits it, the VLR obtains h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) by using the session key C i+1 and T IDnewi . Then the VLR checks to see if h(h (n-i+1) (n 1 )) is the same as l. In this case, the replay message is encrypted by the previous session key C i . The VLR uses the further session key C i+1 to decrypt this intercept message. The replayed message cannot pass the equation test h(h (n-i+1) (n 1 )) =? l. Therefore, the VLR will detect and reject this failed message. Our improved protocol can withstand the replay attack.
User privacy
User anonymity has become an essential functional requirement in mobile communications, because an adversary might intercept the user's identity from the public network and use it to trace the mobile user. However, in the improved protocol, we substitute a temporary identity T ID for the public key K to protect the privacy of the MS in the on-line authentication processes. Since the user's public key K is not transmitted over the public network in the online authentication processes, the adversary cannot trace the mobile user. Besides, after the on-line authentication processes, as the temporary identity T ID is replaced with a new temporary identity T IDnew , the adversary cannot use the old one to figure out the trace of the MS. Therefore, user intractability is achieved by the anonymity of a temporary identity and user anonymity is provided in our improved protocol.
Perfect forward secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy is a form of security requirements in network systems. In general, perfect forward secrecy means that an adversary cannot extract the past session keys, even if, by using some methods, he/she manage to obtain a subset of session keys. If somehow the adversary obtains a subset of session keys C i , he/she can intercept the login message [h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) ⊕T IDnew ] Ci of the MS and decrypt it. However, the adversary cannot compute the further session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ) without the existence of l. He/she can only obtain h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) ⊕T IDnew by decrypting [h (n-i+1) (n 1 )⊕T IDnew ] Ci . The adversary therefore can't compute h (n-i+1) (n 1 )⊕T IDnew ⊕T IDnew =l, since he/she doesn't have the temporary identity T IDnew of MS. That is, only both MS and VLR have the necessary temporary identity T IDnew to obtain l. Therefore, we conclude that our improved protocol can provide perfect forward secrecy.
Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication can be achieved in our improved protocol. In the on-line authentication processes, the MS authenticates the VLR and the HLR by checking N 1 in (n 1 ) and T IDnewi and computes the further session key
Ci as a response to the MS, and the MS decrypts it and verifies the VLR by checking T IDnew . If they are the same, the MS has successfully authenticated the VLR and updates T IDnewi . That is, both the MS and the VLR are able to obtain the same T ID both to compute the session key C i , and to update the further session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ). Therefore, our improved protocol can provide mutual authentication.
The security of session key SK
If the adversary tries to obtain the one-time session key C 1 in the on-line authentication processes, he/she can intercept all the messages from the public wireless environment. However, the adversary cannot compute C 1 = h(N 1 || n 2 || n 3 ||σ) without the user's private key σ. Only the MS and the HLR can compute the session key C 1 = h(N 1 || n 2 || n 3 ||σ), because both have the user's private key σ. Even if the adversary intercepts any messages in the on-line authentication processes, he/she has no way to decrypt [[N 1 , n 3 , ID V , T IDnew ] σ ||n 2 ||l||C 1 ||T IDnew ]K VH to obtain C 1 without relying on the long-term shared key K VH . Besides, the adversary also cannot obtain the session key in the off-line authentication processes, because he/she cannot compute C i+1 = h(l, C i ) without h(h (n-i+1) (n 1 )) and C i . Therefore, our improved protocol can provide the session key security.
Non-repudiation
In the off-line authentication processes, the MS obtains h (n-i+1) (n 1 ) and If a mobile user wants to deny the fact that he/she has transmitted a particular message, the VLR can detect this attempt by using the session key C i . Therefore, our improved protocol can achieve this essential requirement. Table 2 lists the properties of the improved protocol and that of the previously proposed protocols. Compared with the previous protocols, our improved protocol can achieve all the security requirements and provide anonymity service for mobile users to roam in portable communication systems.
Since the Chen et al.'s protocol [1] is the newest protocol in this research area, we compare the efficiency of our improvement with this protocol. Table 3 shows the computation costs of both protocols in an on-line authentication process. Since the setup process and the off-line authentication process of both protocols are similar, we only compare the on-line authentication process between both protocols. We can see that our proposed protocol is more efficient than the Chen et al.'s protocol. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Lee et al.'s protocol fails to provide perfect forward/backward secrecy and is not able to preserve user anonymity. In addition, Lee-Yeh's protocol suffers from the same problems, since Lee et al.'s protocol inherits from Lee and Yeh's protocol. Their protocols fail to provide the anonymity service, which is the key to delegation-based authentication. Neither Lee-Yeh's nor Lee et al.'s protocols can provide perfect forward secrecy, since, if once a subset of session key is revealed, all session keys will be opened. The improved protocol presented in this paper not only retains the advantages from the original research, but also enhances the essential requirements. We therefore believe that our improved protocol will provide a practicable solution in the real world.
